this study attempts to investigate the impacts of severalcorporate governance mechanisms on two alternative proxies for agencycosts, namely the ratio of total sales to total assets (asset turnover) and theratio of selling, general and administrative expenses to total sales(sg&a;). agency costs, non-executive directors on the board, andinstitutional investors are dependent variables. the analysi...

this paper explores the leverage determinants across firms’ sizesbased on the two main theories behind the capital structure, the trade-offand the pecking order theories. a panel data is sued to find therelationship between capital structure and the variables that proxy forbenefits and costs of debt during 1990 to 2006. our findings show thatboth principles help to explain the capital structure...

Dividend policy has long been an issue of interest in the financial literature. To date, a number of studies published on agency costs and dividend policy but most of them are on developed markets, It is well known that the emerging markets are quite different from developed markets in all respects. So, the existing published evidence is of limited relevance in identifying the influence of agen...

in this study, the effect of audit quality on agency costs and information asymmetry has been examined. among the accepted companies 99 ones in tehran stock exchange were selected for statistical samples from 1385 to 1392 in order to attain the research purposes. to measure the audit quality, it has been used the observable variables such as the percentage of institutional investors, the type o...

Managerial opportunism is commonly considered as destructive for the parties involved in an agency relationship. Using a formulation close to Jensen and Meckling’s equity model, we consider an agency relationship between a manager and an investor. The latter is assumed to benefit from a market power in terms of external funding opportunities. For high values of the prevailing rate of interest, ...